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Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Susan Cavan 
 
The other shoe drops 
President Yel'tsin has finally made the move he has seemed to want to make for 
months now: Prime Minister Yevgeni Primakov has been dismissed and replaced 
by his recently named first deputy, Sergei Stepashin. In a televised address, 
Yel'tsin praised Primakov for having achieved "stability" in the economy but 
expressed concerns with his ability to "re-launch" the economy. (AGENCE 
FRANCE-PRESSE, 0433 PDT, 12 May 99; clari.net) 
 
Primakov's dismissal also results in the release of all the government's ministers, 
although Railroads Minister Nikolai Aksyonenko has been asked to remain on as 
Stepashin's first deputy. (INTERFAX News Agency, 12 May 99; 
www.maximov.com) Stepashin, who was said to be reluctant to take on the prime 
ministerial slot, is working on the formation of his cabinet and has asked the 
former ministers to consider staying in the new government. He has received his 
first refusal, unsurprisingly, from Communist Minister Yuri Maslyukov. 
(Jamestown Foundation MONITOR, 12 May 99) 
 
Yel'tsin's motivations for firing Primakov are manifold. Beyond the economic 
rationale he mentioned in his address, Yel'tsin may have justifiable concerns that 
Primakov would act to undo elements of the market reforms that are the hallmark 
of Yel'tsin's presidency. Primakov has also courted the leftist, Communist 
elements in the Duma and a resurgence of the CPRF would represent a 
repudiation of Yel'tsin's anti-Communist legacy. There is also the strictly political 
motive: In January, while Yel'tsin lay ailing in the hospital, Primakov launched an 
attempt to siphon power out of the presidency and consolidate authority around 
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the prime minister through a "power-sharing" agreement eventually brokered with 
Duma representatives. (See previous issues for details.) Yel'tsin, as is well-
known, bristles when underlings overreach their roles. The ironic problem for 
Yel'tsin may well be that his dismissal of the government could hasten and 
strengthen the very trends he was hoping to curtail. 
 
While Yel'tsin's sacking of the government can hardly be characterized as a "bolt 
out of the blue," it is certainly shocking in the degree of destabilization it will bring 
to Russia's already turbulent political system. The timing of the move, coming just 
one day before the Duma begins the impeachment debate, is one curious factor. 
Yel'tsin must be aware that, constitutionally, he cannot disband the Duma once a 
vote for impeachment has been taken. (Article 109, Section 4) Primakov's 
dismissal has radicalized opposition in the Duma, making an affirmative vote on 
a charge against the president far more likely today than yesterday. Duma 
Chairman Gennadi Seleznev claims that the impact of Primakov's dismissal on 
the impeachment vote is that now "400 votes [will be given] where we expected 
300." (INTERFAX News Agency, 12 May 99; www.maximov.com) 
 
It also seems, at the moment, highly unlikely that the Duma will approve 
Stepashin's candidacy in the three ballots required. How does Yel'tsin propose to 
break that deadlock, without being able to disband the Duma; and how will 
Russia form a functioning government? Yel'tsin may attempt to rule by decree 
until new Duma elections are held, but will he wait until the scheduled elections, 
or try to have the impeachment charges declared unconstitutional to pave the 
way for disbanding the Duma? 
 
Questions about Yel'tsin's health lie uneasily at the foundation of this current 
political struggle. It appears probable that Yel'tsin did not challenge Primakov 
earlier in the year because of his need to recuperate from an ulcer and 
respiratory problems. Yel'tsin's recent high visibility around the Kremlin and in the 
media, especially over Kosovo, suggests his health has improved, but the 
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question remains: Is he really well enough to sustain a protracted battle with the 
Duma? 
 
Gustov out, Stepashin in 
Earlier, Vadim Gustov was summarily dismissed from his position as First Deputy 
Prime Minister on 27 April and replaced by Minister of Internal Affairs Sergei 
Stepashin. Stepashin, currently viewed as a Yel'tsin loyalist, will concentrate on 
the upcoming elections and strengthening the center's relations with the regions. 
He will also retain control of the MVD. (THE MOSCOW TIMES, 28 Apr 99; nexis) 
 
While Gustov may have been surprised by the president's decision, his name 
had been mentioned previously as a possible "sacrifice" should Yel'tsin feel the 
need to reassert himself through a personnel shuffle. The dismissal of a first 
deputy prime minister signals Yel'tsin's displeasure with the government; 
removing Gustov seems to represent either a mild rebuke or just the first move in 
a presidential attack on the Primakov government.  
 
Orekhov resignation 
Ruslan Orekhov, deputy chief of the Presidential Administration and head of the 
Main State Legal Administration, has resigned from the Yel'tsin administration. 
Claiming he felt like "a square peg in a round hole," Orekhov initially tendered his 
resignation in February. (MOSCOW NEWS, 28 Apr 99; nexis) It was finally 
accepted on 22 April. 
 
Orekhov had worked in the Main State Legal Administration, and its predecessor, 
since 1993. In leaving the Kremlin, Orekhov noted that he still thought "highly of 
Yel'tsin" but believed the president was "being hoodwinked" through the intrigues 
of his staff. 
 
MVD 
Increased patrols on border with Chechnya 
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Prior to assuming his new government post, Sergei Stepashin announced that 
interior troops from the North Caucasus District would step up patrols around 
Chechnya, in order to attempt to forestall terrorist activities by Chechen rebels. 
(ITAR-TASS, 1348 GMT, 27 Apr 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0427) The move follows a 
series of kidnappings and a bombing in the region. 
 
Report on capital flight 
According to estimates of the interior and economics ministries, illegal monetary 
transfers from Russian to Western banks have resulted in the loss of between 
$50 and $250 billion. The money is believed to represent criminal earnings, 
which are sent abroad for "laundering." The MVD report particularly highlights the 
role of off-shore accounts in Cypress and Russian criminal gangs operating in 
Germany. (INTERFAX, 1149 GMT, 22 Apr 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0422) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By John McDonough and Sarah Miller 
 
Kosovo 'conflict' may be just what the doctor ordered 
NATO's airwar against Yugoslavia is turning out to be just what many in Moscow 
have longed for since the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and subsequent NATO 
plans to expand eastward. Russia's "neutrality" and patience in the Yugoslav 
war, which may have already aided the ailing Russian economy in the form of a 
nearly $5 billion IMF package promised to Moscow only days after NATO 
airstrikes began, is also serving to resuscitate Russian foreign policy. The latest 
round of talks between the key members of NATO and Russia at the G8 
conference in Bonn on 6 May turned out to be a diplomatic victory for Russia. 
Although NATO has not backed off its demands for a substantial withdrawal of 
Yugoslav forces from the Kosovo region in order to suspend airstrikes, it has 
agreed to a UN-led ground contingent as a peace implementation force in 
Kosovo. While all of official Moscow agrees that there are still several obstacles 
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to any lasting agreement over Kosovo, Yel'tsin and Ivanov were quick to claim at 
least a small diplomatic victory with regard to the NATO-Russian agreement on 
the UN-led peacekeeping force. (AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 0656 GMT, 6 
May 99; nexis, and INTERFAX, 6 May 99; nexis) Such a peace plan serves 
Moscow's ultimate goal of subordinating NATO to the United Nations and other 
international organizations such as the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe. Moscow is becoming increasingly efficient at spinning 
NATO mishaps and the alliance's inability to force Milosevic to accept its 
demands into opportunities to strengthen Moscow's hand in the resolution of the 
conflict as well as advancing Russia's diplomatic standing in other regions of the 
world. 
 
Ivanov heads south in search of regional influence 
President Boris Yel'tsin recently directed his foreign minister to visit several 
Middle East countries in an attempt not only to energize the on-again-off-again 
peace process to which Russia claims the role of co-sponsor but also to advance 
Russia's influence throughout the region. While Ivanov did not break any new 
ground in the peace process during his Middle East tour, he did take the 
opportunity to deride NATO and push the idea that Russia should serve as lead 
mediator in the peace process. Ivanov met with Egyptian President Husni 
Mubarak, PLO leader Yasir Arafat and Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad during his 
tour and indicated that these leaders all touted Russia as the objective agent for 
the peace process. (ITAR-TASS News Agency World Service, 1841 GMT, 26 Apr 
99; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts/nexis) Although this position is not new, 
Ivanov attempted to draw a parallel between NATO actions in Kosovo and the 
West's desire for influence in the Middle East. Ivanov claimed that NATO's 
Kosovo operation is just another example of the West's unipolar approach to 
international relations and offered Russia as the flag bearer of a multipolar world. 
Following his visit to the Middle East, Ivanov said that "a fight for the region is 
now under way -- not for influence, but for taking part in resolving problems... 
(and) all the leaders I met showed an interest in an active Moscow policy 
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because Russia is now trusted, Russia is now a factor of stability. Russia is 
inciting no conflict in any region. It is trying to search for political solutions to 
international problems." (ITAR-TASS News Agency World Service, 1410 GMT, 
26 Apr 99; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts/nexis) 
 
It appears as though Russia is using NATO's airstrikes against Yugoslavia as 
ammunition to undermine NATO credibility in Europe as well as US influence in 
the Middle East and perhaps even Southeast Asia. As long as the airstrikes 
continue, Moscow can portray the US-led coalition as the aggressor and Russia 
as the peacemaker, opening doors for Moscow to serve as the mediator in other 
regional conflicts. 
 
It ain't over 'til it's over 
And yet it's apparently over. The Russo-Chinese Demarcation Commission has 
finally completed its seven-year effort to map the Russo-Chinese border. The 
demarcation effort marks the end of over 300 years of border disputes. Although 
the documents will be signed at the next summit meeting, the issue hasn't been 
entirely resolved. The fates of three large islands have yet to be decided, but will 
remain under Russian jurisdiction until the sides negotiate their status. 
(ASSOCIATED PRESS, 27 Apr 99; CNN.com) This will not deter Russia and 
China from signing the agreements on demarcation at the next summit, 
apparently, nor from concluding bilateral military talks between China's Military 
Chairman Zhang Wannian and President Yel'tsin, Prime Minister Primakov, First 
Deputy Prime Minister Maslyukov and Defense Minister Sergeev. (ITAR-TASS, 
23 Apr 99; nexis) The talks will focus on bilateral military cooperation, Kosovo, 
the US-Japan Defense Pact, US Theater Missile Defense (TMD) proposals and 
possible Russian arms exports to China. A springtime thaw seems to have 
descended upon these old foes. It was only 1969 when their troops last fought 
along the border, but now a new chapter seems to have been opened, which 
may quite possibly begin with Russia arming its old enemy. 
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Russian diplomacy heads south 
Speaking of new chapters, Russia appears to be opening yet another in South 
Asia. Moscow has been pursuing relations with East Asian countries for many 
years, but only recently began to open a discourse with India, and now Pakistan. 
It was Yevgeni Primakov who first suggested a strategic triangle to strengthen 
security in Eurasia. Although the strategic partnership concept was discarded 
before it was ever adopted, Russian diplomacy reveals an effort to broaden the 
dialogue with South Asia in general. To that end, Yel'tsin met with Indian Prime 
Minister Sharif in Moscow, while a Russian parliamentary commission met with 
the Indian and Pakistani parliaments as well. (ITAR-TASS, 0817 GMT, 22 Apr 
99; FBIS-SOV-99-0422) The topics of discussion ranged from NATO's action in 
Kosovo to the region's own security problems such as Jammu and Kashmir. 
(RADIO PAKISTAN, 1300 GMT, 21 Apr 99; FBIS-NES-99-0421) Russia seems 
to enjoy its role in the Kosovo crisis, and thus far, a similar Russian intermediary 
role seems to be welcomed by the Indians in local regional disputes. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Michael Thurman 
 
REGIONS 
Boris wins one 
By replacing the largely ineffective First Deputy Prime Minister Vadim Gustov 
with Interior Minister Sergei Stepashin, Yel'tsin scored a victory against Prime 
Minister Primakov. While Gustov's dismissal was no loss to Primakov, Stepashin, 
as a loyal and powerful ally of Yel'tsin, most certainly is. Gustov was largely 
ineffective because he lacked access to the resources of any ministry. Stepashin 
will remain interior minister. By heading the Russian internal police, Stepashin 
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should make a more formidable defender of the government's prerogatives vis-a-
vis the regions' than Gustov. 
 
Not only is Stepashin in charge of the government's regional policy, he is also 
involved in running national elections, including the upcoming Duma election 
scheduled for December 1999. This puts him in the position of being able to 
affect its outcome, as well as the presidential elections next year. By giving the 
Russian election authority access to martial force, Stepashin becomes perhaps 
the most powerful person in the federation. 
 
The blurring of the lines between Stepashin's police and electoral responsibilities 
can be seen in Karachay-Cherkessia, a small republic in the North Caucasus 
where the second round of presidential elections is underway. Admittedly the 
North Caucasus republics are more volatile than other areas of the federation, 
but the general process of threatening military force to influence electoral 
outcomes might be quite similar. 
 
The contenders for president in Karachaevo-Cherkessia are the mayor of the 
Cherkessk, Stanislav Derev, who won 40.1 percent of the vote in the first round, 
and the former commander of Russian ground forces, Vladimir Semenov, with 
17.9 percent. Derev is an ethnic Cherkes, a group that makes up 9.7 percent of 
Karachaevo-Cherkessia's population. Semenov is an ethnic Karachay, which 
comprise 31.2 percent of the republic's population, but his mother is an ethnic 
Russian -- 42 percent of the republic are ethnic Russians. (East-West Institute, 
RUSSIAN REGIONAL REPORT, 29 Apr 99) 
 
The republic is the last region in the federation to elect a chief executive. The 
campaign has been marred by violence, Molotov cocktails thrown hither and yon, 
and, as Stepashin himself noted, there is fear that even if a president were to be 
elected, the conflict could escalate. His fears are perhaps not entirely unfounded. 
Comment has been made that, if Derev is elected, the Karachay population will 
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push to secede from the republic. So, in the spirit of ensuring free and fair 
elections, Stepashin sent 700 internal troops to monitor the situation. (RUSSIAN 
TV, 1300 GMT, 5 May 99; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts/nexis) 
 
This monitoring service is in fact regional military policy by other means. 
Stepashin has been active in the North Caucasus for quite a while now, ranging 
from his initial involvement in the Chechnya war, to recent military maneuvers in 
the region. On 22 April unprecedented military exercises were begun in the North 
Caucasus, with some 10,000 servicemen from the internal troops, in addition to 
the 4th air army, units of the Federal Border Guard Service and the air defense 
system, and police from Dagestan, North Ossetia-Alania, Ingushetia, 
Karachaevo-Cherkessia, Kabarda-Balkaria and Stavropol Territory. The purpose 
is to train local forces to be able to respond effectively to regional instability as 
well as to flex a bit of muscle. The exercises are scheduled to run until 15 May. 
(RUSSIAN TV, 1600 GMT, 22 Apr 99; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts/ 
nexis) 
 
What this suggests is that Stepashin as elections monitor and regional point-man 
cannot be separated from Stepashin as head of the Russian internal police. This 
is, of course, no accident; Yel'tsin wants his side to make a good showing in the 
Duma elections, and, one might suppose, provide a mechanism for influencing 
the emerging electoral blocs. But has Stepashin become too powerful? Could he 
not play both Primakov and Yel'tsin against each other in an effort to retain, or 
expand his power? 
 
Lebed' enacts administrative coup in Krasnoyarsk Territory 
Entirely bypassing the elected bodies of the region, Governor Aleksandr Lebed' 
issued an order establishing a parallel governing structure consisting of 
Muscovites of Krasnoyarsk origin. He has been preparing the region for such a 
takeover for a while. Secret administrative bodies have long been operating, 
including a security council, which is comprised of the heads of all law-
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enforcement organs in the territory. (MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, 28 Apr 99; 
nexis) 
 
The construction of his mini-presidential republic within a republic is the result of 
two processes which have essentially cut him off from accessing the normal 
administrative mechanisms of the region. First, since assuming the governorship 
of the territory, Lebed' has managed to alienate himself from the territory's formal 
and informal power brokers, by not honoring a deal with the Communists in 
parliament to include them in his cabinet, by picking fights with persons of local 
importance, and by importing Moscow loyalists to staff his administration. 
Second, and largely in response to the first point, the territory's parliament 
passed a law significantly curtailing his authority. His response was not to try to 
patch up his differences; instead he decided to bypass his opposition, effectively 
creating a second regional administration. 
 
Lebed' may or may not be a special case of gubernatorial authoritarianism, but 
he is certainly one of the most visible. What this suggests is that the 
decentralization of power in the federation as a whole is also apparent in the 
regions, as mayors and other local leaders battle with their governors for power 
and resources. 
 
POLITICAL PARTIES 
Russian National Unity party may participate in Duma elections 
Justice Minister Pavel Krasheninnikov announced that any organization which 
failed to register for the 19 December Duma elections will be allowed to form a 
bloc with any party that had qualified, and can thereby participate in the Duma 
campaign. This means that the All-Russia public-political movement and 
members of the Russian National Unity (RNU), although not qualified to run, will 
be able to participate if they can find a partner. The justice minister also 
defended his decision to register Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov's Fatherland party 
for the Duma elections even though there were some technical problems. (ITAR-
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TASS News Agency World Service, 1913 GMT, 4 May 99; BBC Summary of 
World Broadcasts/nexis) 
 
Both of these statements raise some serious questions about the role of parties 
in Russia today. If political organizations can simply form electoral blocs with 
registered parties, what is the purpose of registration? And if the rules for party 
registration can be bent to serve the interests of powerful politicians, again what 
use are the rules? Paradoxically perhaps, the Russian state would significantly 
strengthen its hand if it clearly defined what a political party is and focused on 
registering only those organizations that qualify. The fate of all other movements, 
blocs, etc. should be left up to the whims of the free market of ideas. The second 
task should be to ensure that parties are registered for national and regional 
office separately, though with the same criteria and procedures established by 
federal legislation. This is, of course, the problem. If both the center and the 
regions agreed on how to proceed, progress would surely be made. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By CDR Fred Drummond 
 
MiG fighter updates 
Status reports on two MiG aircraft programs were published recently. Starting 
with the oldest platform, Tass reported on the "modernized MiG-21-93" fighter. 
First, some background: Design work on the MiG-21 began in the late 1940s; 
over the next two decades the aircraft became the most widely produced jet 
fighter in the world. Originally designed as a day interceptor with limited radar, 
armament, and fuel capacity, the plane was developed through numerous major 
upgrades to provide all-weather attack capability for both air and ground targets. 
The modernization program is the latest Russian effort in the aircraft's ongoing 
evolution. The purpose is to tap what is estimated to be a fairly significant foreign 
market, where countries with limited resources can upgrade their existing MiG-21 
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inventories to modern day ("fourth generation") fighter aircraft standards. This is 
potentially a very competitive market, as upgraded MiGs are competing with 
more advanced aircraft such as the US F-16 and French Mirage 2000. Early 
model F-16s are fairly cheap, as jet fighters go. Over 3,500 F-16s have been built 
worldwide, and it is still currently in production. Russia is trying to compete 
against other countries (and itself, through cooperation agreements with foreign 
aircraft manufacturers) in this close-fought battle of worldwide air force 
modernization. 
 
The short Tass news release focused on the first test firings of the R-73 air-to-air, 
heat-seeking missile from the MiG-21-93. An official of the aviation plant 
responsible for the jet's development was quoted as saying that this "confirmed 
the efficiency" of the aircraft's radar. (ITAR-TASS, 1313 GMT, 27 Apr 99; 
BBC/nexis) Well, that's not really the case. While the radar likely was used in 
initially detecting the target, the success of the reported firings is due to the R-73 
missiles themselves. The heat-seeking (infrared) missiles fly out to their targets 
without support from an aircraft's radar, relying instead on the thermal source of 
their intended victim. So, the test shows that the R-73 missile works. Radar 
missile firings are scheduled for early May. Good luck to the Russians in their 
upgrades and sales pitches. 
 
A brief update on the latest MiG, the MFI (Russian initials for multipurpose 
fighter), was released by Interfax. Introduced with fanfare by the Russians in 
January, and subject to much controversy and speculation (see Editorial Digests 
1 February 99 and 22 March 99), the aircraft ideally was to take flight for the first 
time in February. Now, with "eighty percent" of the aircraft "checked," the first 
flight might occur in May. At least work is continuing on the plane. (INTERFAX, 
0858 GMT, 5 May 99; nexis) 
 
Buy our aircraft carrier, or else 
 13 
The latest in the on-again, off-again sale of the Russian aircraft carrier, the 
Admiral Gorshkov, to India is an ultimatum, of sorts: Buy the ship or it "would be 
modernized for Russian navy use." (PTI, 0806 GMT, 5 May 99; nexis) According 
to the Indian press agency's report, citing an ITAR-TASS source, a high-ranking 
Russian naval officer stated that India has until July to decide whether it will buy 
the ship. Conflicting statements have been made on the possibility of the sale 
(see Editorial Digest, 16 February 99); perhaps this most recent mention is a ploy 
by the Russians to get the Indian government to conclude the deal, talk of which 
began in 1994. Since the Russians have a hard time as it is maintaining a viable 
air component on their one remaining aircraft carrier, the Kuznetsov, the 
likelihood of the Gorshkov being decommissioned into the Russian Navy is slight 
at best. 
 
Pasko's lawyers claim case is harassment 
Russian Navy Captain Grigori Pasko is currently on trial in Vladivostok on 
espionage charges. (See Editorial Digest, 4 November 98 and 9 December 98.) 
Pasko finished his testimony in late April, and afterward Pasko's lawyer Anatoly 
Pyshkin talked to the press concerning the trial developments. In an Interfax 
report, Pyshkin stated that Pasko was disliked and harassed by both Russian 
Pacific Fleet and Federal Security Service (FSB) personnel because he refused 
to "collaborate" with the security officials and had published critical articles on the 
fleet's command. (INTERFAX, 1229 GMT, 27 Apr 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0427) 
Pasko is charged with treason in handing over state secrets to a Japanese 
television company and newspaper. Pasko has claimed that he is being hounded 
in part due to his uncovering of fraud and misdeeds by the Pacific Fleet in 
addition to his documenting hazardous environmental practices. Pasko states 
that all of his information came from unclassified sources; the charges against 
him are still classified top secret by the Russian prosecutors. 
 
Agence France-Presse reported Pasko's countercharges in more detail, calling 
his statements a "vitriolic attack . . . on FSB investigators." Pasko reminded 
 14 
readers that he has been illegally detained for over a year and half, on charges 
he states are "fabricated" by the FSB working in support of the Pacific Fleet. 
(AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 0855 GMT, 30 Apr 99; nexis) 
 
Previous press reports mentioned that the Japanese media companies were 
reluctant to get involved in the trial, and maintained a hands-off approach to the 
whole affair. This point helps explain another Interfax report that states Pasko 
discontinued his own lawsuit against NHK, the Japanese broadcasting company. 
Pasko, somewhat ironically, had turned to a Russian court in order to protect his 
copyright of a film on the Pacific Fleet dumping radioactive pollution. Speaking 
again through his lawyer, Pasko mentioned that the involved Russian and 
Japanese journalists were being used as "pawns" by Russian security officials, 
and he thought it "improper" for journalists to "settle their disputes through court 
action." (INTERFAX, 1109 GMT, 6 May 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0506) Meanwhile, 
the world watches to see if the Russian legal system upholds the rule of law in 
the Pasko case and that of fellow Russian naval officer Aleksandr Nikitin. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: CIS 
By Sarah Miller 
 
GUUAM+P+R a.k.a. MAP GURU? 
Georgian and Azeri officials have suggested that GUUAM may be enlarged 
again. (INTERFAX, 0748 GMT, 28 Apr 99; FBIS-SOV-99-0428) According to the 
Azeris, Poland and Romania have expressed interest in the next round of 
enlargement, although neither country has publicly confirmed this. (RFE/RL 
NEWSLINE, 4 May 99) GUUAM is an economic cooperation organization 
founded in 1998 as GUAM and joined by Uzbekistan in April 1999. Although it is 
expressly non-military, at the press conference following its enlargement the 
presidents stated their commitment to four main security cooperation areas. 
These areas included the inviolability of borders, rejection of "aggressive 
 15 
separatism" and "ethnic intolerance," resistance to "religious extremism," and 
prevention of arms flows to conflict areas. (Jamestown Foundation MONITOR, 
27 Apr 99) They also pledged to expand cooperation with the NATO Partnership 
for Peace project and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. According to Azeri 
President Aliev, who is also GUUAM chairman, the organization concerns itself 
purely with economic cooperation that "will only strengthen the CIS." (ITAR-
TASS, 1942 GMT, 25 Apr 99; FBIS-SOV-99-0425) The two countries that may 
join the organization, Poland and Romania, are a current NATO member and a 
NATO-member aspirant, respectively. In addition, Georgia, also a CIS member, 
has indicated its intention to apply for NATO membership. 
 
The Russian response to GUAM enlargement has been quiet observation. 
Russia acknowledges that CIS members are not bound solely to the 
commonwealth and may form other organizations within or outside the CIS. 
Given the Uzbek, Georgian and Azeri refusal to extend the CIS Collective 
Security Treaty, it is not surprising that GUUAM has stressed its non-military role. 
However, GUUAM's commitment to security suggests at least a defensive role in 
addition to its economic one. In the event that one of the aforementioned security 
areas is threatened by one of the numerous security issues within GUUAM, the 
alliance would facilitate inter-GUUAM resolution. Since GUUAM members and 
Russia are at odds on many of these issues, the situation could become muddled 
if NATO members are GUUAM members as well. 
 
The Armenians test their toys 
Armenia took the opportunity to test its newest playthings, S-300s and MiG-29s, 
at a late April joint air defense exercise. The exercise was held under the 
auspices of the CIS Joint Air Defense System, which includes Armenia, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia. (ITAR-TASS, 1059 GMT, 22 Apr 99; FBIS-
SOV-99-0422) This latest exercise shows that, in spite of their dwindling 
numbers, the five remaining CIS Collective Security Treaty members are 
continuing with military cooperation. The exercises reportedly tested the air 
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defense system using a scenario in which an enemy aircraft has entered CIS 
territory and is forced to land in Armenia or be shot down. (Jamestown 
Foundation MONITOR, 23 Apr 99) The exercise successfully tested Armenia's 
toys as well as the joint system in general. However, in light of the new GUUAM 
enlargement, various regional hotbeds, and animosity amongst some GUUAM 
and Collective Security members, the situation isn't to be toyed with at all. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
UKRAINE 
Happy anniversary! (maybe) 
It's either a wonderful or a terrible anniversary in Crimea this month, depending 
on whom you ask. On 6 May, Ukrainian and Russian ministers grandly 
celebrated the 55th anniversary of Sevastopol's "liberation ... from fascists" in 
1944. At the same time, Tatars began preparation to commemorate their mass 
expulsion from Crimea, which began just days after their homeland's "liberation" 
from Germany. 
 
Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeev joined Ukrainian President Leonid 
Kuchma in a day-long series of events celebrating Germany's retreat. Those 
events included a memorial service for Soviet soldiers who died in the fight for 
Sevastopol. (ITAR-TASS World Service, 1108 GMT, 5 May 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-
0505) 
 
As these events were taking place, the Crimean National Assembly (which is not 
recognized by the Ukrainian government) announced that it has organized a 
massive protest march to coincide with the 18 May anniversary of the forced 
expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Tatars to the Urals, Kazakhstan and Asia. 
 
 17 
The march has been organized during a year in which it seems as if many of the 
gains made by Tatars since they began to be repatriated in 1987 have 
evaporated. Although Tatars now constitute 12 percent of the Crimean 
population, the new constitution for the Autonomous Republic of Crimea does not 
allow for the speaking of the Tatar language in schools or businesses. The 
constitution also removed previous legal guarantees of Tatar representation in 
the Crimean parliament. 
 
The constitution clearly has become a flash point in the rapidly deteriorating 
Tatar-Ukrainian relations. A press release about the upcoming protest march 
explained, "After the Crimean Tatars were deprived of their representation in the 
Crimean Republican Parliament, the constitution ... was adopted and approved, 
[and] the Crimean Tatar language was excluded from official life of the Crimea, ... 
the Crimean Tatar people ... are trying to express their concern about the issues 
and hardships of Crimean Tatars." (PRESS SERVICE AND DEPARTMENT ON 
POLITICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES ... OF THE CRIMEAN TATAR PEOPLE, 5 
May 99; Turkistan News and Information Service) 
 
However, there has also been an increase in violence against Tatar-owned 
property in recent months. Several mosques were destroyed in suspicious fires, 
several graveyards were seriously damaged, and a monument to those who died 
during deportation was vandalized. (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 6 May 99; Turkistan 
News and Information Service) 
 
Over the next weeks, Tatar protesters will gather in seven cities to begin 
marching toward Simferopol, where they will meet in Lenin Square on 18 May. 
From the rhetoric being used by the Crimean Tatar National Assembly, it will not 
be an easy month for the administration in Crimea, or most likely, for the 
administration in Kyiv. The 18th of May "is the day of the struggle against the 
national lawlessness and oppression in our motherland," the press release 
states. "This is the day of anger and protest. ... It will be until the rights of our 
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people will be restored." (PRESS SERVICE AND DEPARTMENT ON 
POLITICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES ... OF THE CRIMEAN TATAR PEOPLE, 5 
May 1999; Turkistan News and Information Service) 
 
Enemy #6 
President Kuchma has recently been begging for attention from the West. Well, 
by George, now he's got it. 
 
On 3 May, the US Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) released its list of the 
10 "Enemies of the Press 1999." At number six, behind leaders such as 
Slobodan Milosevic, Fidel Castro and Jiang Zemin, sits Leonid Kuchma. The 
inclusion of Kuchma is surprising, given the exclusion of Belarus' Alyaksandr 
Lukashenka, and given the strength of the opposition-ruled Ukrainian parliament. 
It is not completely shocking, however, when the sometimes brutish behavior of 
Kuchma's appointed minister of information is examined. 
 
Kuchma controls no media, outright, in Ukraine. However, Minister of Information 
Zinovy Kulyk used the government's control of printing facilities to stifle several 
opposition papers early in 1998, shortly before the last parliamentary elections, 
and continues to use the country's strict libel laws to threaten reporters and 
editors with possible prosecution. The most high-profile attack on press freedom 
came in January 1998, when the information ministry ordered the state printing 
house to stop producing the opposition daily Pravda Ukrainy. The paper had 
been staunchly supporting Pavel Lazarenko's Hromada party, and was forced to 
close when its editors could not find a printer willing to publish the paper. Shortly 
after, the managing editor of the newspaper was arrested and held in jail for 
several months without any charge. The parliament has since condemned the 
action, and ordered the reopening of the newspaper, but with a new more neutral 
administration. 
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Several other opposition papers also stopped printing after losing libel cases and 
being assessed huge fines. The parliament has called for Kulyk's resignation, but 
Kuchma has not supported these calls. 
 
The most disturbing accusation from the CPJ, however, is its charge of "tacit 
acceptance of violence against journalists," which the organization said, 
"encouraged bombings of newspaper offices, [and] assaults on reporters and 
editors... " (COMMITTEE TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS PRESS RELEASE, 3 
May 99) No specifics are provided in the short paragraph written about Kuchma, 
though, and representatives of CPJ were not available for comment. 
 
There were, of course, a number of attacks against reporters in 1998. The media 
reports of those incidents, however, do not reveal any connection between the 
attacks and the Kuchma administration. In fact, at least one of the attacks was 
against a reporter "investigating mafia activities," and others were in relatively 
remote areas of the country, where Kuchma's influence would seemingly be 
more limited. (AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 1857 GMT, 6 Feb 99; nexis, and 
UNIAN, 1315 GMT, 5 Feb 98; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts/nexis)  
 
It cannot be disputed, however, that reporters in Ukraine face a number of major 
hurdles to doing their jobs, not the least of which is a Soviet-style minister of 
information skilled at using intimidation as a weapon. As the country moves into 
another election season, these journalists' jobs will undoubtedly become even 
more difficult. 
 
And they're off! 
The Ukrainian presidential election season has officially begun, with candidates 
exiting the gates and rushing to collect the required one million signatures for 
their names to be placed on the ballot. 
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President Kuchma officially announced his candidacy on 9 May, while the two 
arms of Rukh have united behind one candidate, former Foreign Minister 
Gennadi Udovenko. (RIA News Agency, 1323 GMT, 21 Apr 99; BBC Worldwide 
Monitoring/nexis, and DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, 1555 CET, 1 Mar 99; 
nexis) 
 
As of today, the overflowing field also includes former Prime Minister Yevgeny 
Marchuk (unaffiliated), Communist Party leader Petro Simonenko, Progressive 
Socialist Party head Natalya Vitrenko, Socialist Party Chairman Oleksandr 
Moroz, and (currently unannounced) Parliament Speaker Oleksandr Tkachenko 
(Peasant Party). It is expected that the leftist parties will attempt to unite behind 
one candidate. Therefore, the battle between Tkachenko and Simonenko should 
begin to heat up very shortly. 
 
In the latest presidential poll, conducted in March before most candidates had 
officially declared, Kuchma led with 22.1 percent, while Vitrenko followed closely 
with 17.4 percent. The rest of the pack trailed badly, with Moroz at 9 percent, 
Simonenko at 6.4 percent, Udovenko at 3 percent and Tkachenko at 1.8 percent. 
(VCHIRNEY KYIV, internet version, 27 Mar 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0409) 
 
The participants with the stamina to complete the race are scheduled to cross the 
finish line on 31 October. 
 
BELARUS 
Goin' to the chapel, and we're...well, maybe later 
The unity dance continues in Belarus, as President Alyaksandr Lukashenka this 
week intensified his plea for Russia to create a more unified state. Lukashenka 
went to Russia on 28 April to offer Boris Yel'tsin a "radical" proposal, which 
included -- in his words -- "a united, union state. We support the idea of having 
definite, firm power in this state." (NTV, 1540 GMT, 28 Apr 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-
04) Lukashenka also suggested that there should be a vice president and an 
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elected parliament. As expected, Yel'tsin's response was lukewarm at best, 
leaving Lukashenka "disappointed" with his Russian counterpart. Although 
Yel'tsin and Lukashenka signed 11 agreements dealing with, among other things, 
customs and defense, the Russian side suggested gradual unification, with no 
apparent timetable. 
 
Lukashenka's statements were given an inordinate amount of attention in the 
local Belarusian and Russian press, and treated as if they were new, fresh ideas 
for relations between Russia and Belarus. The problem is -- they aren't. 
Lukashenka has been suggesting "supranational government bodies," with a 
"head of the union" and a parliament, since December 1998 when the original 
"unification treaty" was signed. (For further background, see INTERFAX, 0737 
GMT, 28 Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-98-362.) However, as reported in the 13 January 
1999 Editorial Digest, after signing the "treaty," which really amounted to a very 
broad outline, Russia began almost immediately backing down from early 
statements supporting a completely unified Russia-Belarus state. Throughout 
1999, that Russian hesitance has continued, leaving the treaty's outline almost 
exactly as it was in 1998. 
 
It appears as though things will continue in this same vein for at least several 
months, as both sides admitted that no decisions were made about an 
appropriate model for future integration. So, while Lukashenka hasn't yet been 
left at the altar, his bride is still deciding whether to make an appearance. 
 
Newfound cooperation and support 
Voting has suddenly begun throughout Belarus in the opposition's unsanctioned 
presidential election. On 4 May, the disbanded parliament decided to have voters 
"cast their ballots at their place of residence" over a period of 10 days from 6 May 
to 16 May. (BELAPAN, 1640 GMT, 4 May 99; BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts/nexis) The opposition had previously stated that voting would take 
place at polling stations on 16 May. 
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It appears that President Lukashenka's campaign of intimidation and brutality 
against opposition forces may have finally reached its goal. The Popular Front, 
whose presidential candidate, Zyanon Paznyak, is living in the United States, 
protested the decision, saying that it does not conform with election law, and that 
it was adopted "under pressure" from President Lukashenka. (RFE/RL 
NEWSLINE, 4 May 99) There was no comment from the second presidential 
candidate, former Prime Minister Mikhail Chyhir, who is being held in prison on 
questionable charges of embezzlement. 
 
Lukashenka's lack of comment is most telling, however. It appears Lukashenka's 
concern over the increasing support for the opposition -- as evidenced by the 
KGB's crackdown -- has been alleviated. It is likely that, after the votes are 
counted, Lukashenka will have won by a huge margin. 
 
MOLDOVA 
'They're my weapons!' 'No, they're my weapons!' 
The weaponry of the Russian 14th Army division in Dniestr has become a major 
source of disagreement among the three sides involved in the Dniestr conflict. At 
the end of April, then Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Vadim Gustov met 
with Moldovan representatives in Chisinau and agreed to begin immediate 
withdrawal of 14th Army weapons. At the same time, Moldova consented to give 
up its previously agreed-upon 30 percent share of 14th Army weapons. 
(INTERFAX, 1534 GMT, 28 Apr 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0429) Although Russian 
representatives had made similar statements in the past, it appears from the 
reaction of the Dniestr administration that Gustov was serious this time. 
 
Igor Smirnov, the leader of the breakaway republic, announced immediately that 
he would not attend a previously scheduled summit in Kyiv. That summit had 
earlier been rescheduled from 9 April to 30 April. A new date has not been set. 
(SEGODNYA, 23 Apr 99; What the Papers Say/nexis) 
 23 
 
Meanwhile, the 14th Army's weapons remain entrenched in Dniestr, with all sides 
waiting to see just how serious Russia was about its offer. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Transcaucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
CHECHNYA 
Sergei Stepashin's credentials 
Russia's new acting prime minister earned his place in history five years before 
his current appointment. In 1994 he was the director of the Federal 
Counterintelligence Service (FSK), tasked with gathering intelligence on the 
internal scene in Chechnya and coordinating Russia's covert sponsorship of the 
opposition to President Dzhokar Dudaev's government. The November 1994 
unmasking of the spectacular failure of Russian secret efforts to manipulate 
Chechen politics led to the full-scale invasion the following month. According to 
one author, due to his "personal intrigues and total misreading of the Chechen 
military potential" Stepashin "was personally responsible for the intervention." 
[Anatol Lieven, CHECHNYA: TOMBSTONE OF RUSSIAN POWER (New Haven: 
1998), p. 13] 
 
In early August 1994, President Yel'tsin indicated that Russia would use covert 
methods to unseat Dudaev, telling journalists: "If we use force against Chechnya, 
... there will be so much blood that no one would ever forgive us for it." However, 
"the role of opposition to Dudayev is growing in Chechnya, and I would not say 
that we have not influenced the process at all." (ITAR-TASS, 1151 GMT, 11 Aug 
94; FBIS-SOV-94-155) Stepashin reiterated the same thought, listing the 
agencies that would not use force: The FSK, the interior ministry, the defense 
ministry. The government, he said, stood ready to negotiate with any side that 
accepted Russian sovereignty over Chechnya. (SEGODNYA, 18 Aug 94; FBIS-
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SOV-94-160) Shortly thereafter, the Russian government publicly endorsed the 
Provisional Council which posed a military challenge to the Dudaev government, 
thereby robbing the council of what little legitimacy it enjoyed among the 
Chechen population. 
 
At this stage, the narrow circle of Yel'tsin's advisers, Stepashin and Nationalities 
Minister Sergei Shakhrai most prominent among them, sought to provide 
logistical and financial support for various armed groups within Chechnya that 
attacked the Dudaev government. By summer's end, Dudaev's military proved 
capable of repelling any attacks from such groups but did not rout them entirely. 
Dudaev's restraint was perceived in Moscow as weakness. 
 
The Kremlin was also perturbed by the formation of a mediation mission headed 
by Ruslan Khasbulatov, the ethnic Chechen former chairman of the Supreme 
Soviet and Yel'tsin's arch-nemesis. It seems that the FSK intensified its efforts to 
create alternative and obedient power centers upon the arrival of this genuinely 
popular politician who proclaimed his readiness to cooperate with all the other 
factions. 
 
The defeat of the FSK-sponsored Gantemirov faction in October propelled the 
FSK to the next level of engagement. Now the FSK would recruit Russian 
mercenaries to unseat Dudaev. According to an Izvestia article, Gantemirov and 
Provisional Council leader Avturkhanov became frequent visitors to Moscow. In 
November Russian counterintelligence operatives toured the Solnechnogorsk 
and Naro-Fominsk garrisons to recruit "volunteers:" 79 servicemen from four 
divisions were taken under contract and paid 1 million rubles. They were given T-
72 tanks in Mozdok, where they trained together with Chechen crews. Of the 40 
tanks there, 15 had Russian crews. According to Izvestia sources, 
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The FSK engaged in information backup, the Defense Ministry elaborated the 
actual part of the operation, the Ministry for Nationality Affairs in the shape of 
[Deputy Nationalities Minister] Kotenkov decided organizational issues ... and the 
military counterintelligence sought volunteers. (IZVESTIA, 25 Nov 95, p. 2; FBIS-
SOV-95-228) 
 
The 25 November operation proved a disaster. Not only did the troops fail to 
capture Grozny, but Dudaev's forces took the tank crews prisoner. On 28 
November he challenged the Russian government to admit that the crew 
members were Russian servicemen, in which case they would be treated as 
prisoners of war; otherwise they would be executed as bandits. 
(RADIOSTANTSIYA EKHO MOSKVY, 28 Nov 94; FBIS-SOV-94-229) On the 
following day, at a meeting of the Security Council, Yel'tsin decided to intervene 
with "all the forces and means at the disposal of the state." (Lievan, p. 92) 
 
The captured soldiers described on national television how they were initially 
approached by the army counterintelligence, then interviewed and hired by the 
FSK. They received permission from their superiors and were promised they 
would return to their original units after the completion of the operation, the 
nature of which was not revealed to them at the outset. At the Mozdok base their 
identification papers and personal belongings were taken away. One of the 
soldiers remarked that he felt as though "our government was deliberately 
sending us to our deaths." (RUSSIAN TELEVISION NETWORK, 3 Dec 94; FBIS-
SOV-94-233) 
 
This ignominious episode and the two years of bloodletting that followed stem in 
no small part from Stepashin's political and operational failures. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central China 
By Monika Shepherd 
 26 
 
TAJIKISTAN 
Tajik president throws yet another wrench into peace process 
The Tajik president once again clearly demonstrated his extreme reluctance to 
fulfill the terms of the peace agreement's political protocol, when he rejected 
nearly all of the National Reconciliation Commission's (NRC's) proposed 
amendments to the country's constitution which had been submitted for his 
approval on 26 March. The president responded to the NRC's proposals on 3 
April and his message was presented to all of the NRC delegates at their 13 April 
session. (VOICE OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, 1600 GMT, 24 Apr 99; 
BBC Worldwide Monitoring/nexis) According to the general peace agreement 
signed by President Rahmonov and United Tajik Opposition (UTO) Chairman 
Said Abdullo Nuri in June 1997, one of the NRC's main tasks is to reform the 
country's election laws through the process of constitutional amendment in order 
that new presidential and parliamentary elections might take place at the end of 
this year. The NRC (composed of 26 members: half from the opposition, half 
from the government) has been struggling with the issue of constitutional change 
for the past year; fundamental disagreements over certain political questions 
often caused the commission's work to grind to a halt. Consequently, new 
elections, which were originally to be held in Fall 1998, were postponed for one 
year. Unless the international community brings considerable pressure to bear on 
President Rahmonov's administration, it is beginning to seem likely that the 
elections may have to be rescheduled yet again. 
 
UN Special Envoy to Tajikistan Jan Kubis has expressed concern over the slow 
pace of the peace process numerous times. In a 21 April meeting with UTO 
Chairman Nuri, Mr. Kubis pointed out two other requirements listed by the peace 
agreement's political protocol which President Rahmonov has yet to meet. The 
Tajik president must grant full legal status to all the opposition parties 
represented in the UTO, and permit the open distribution of their publications. He 
must also agree to the appointment of opposition members to posts in the 
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country's regional and district administrations. Thus far, 22 UTO representatives 
have been granted government positions, but only at the national level. (RFE/RL 
NEWSLINE, 23 Apr 99) In order for any real changes to occur in the 
management of local affairs, the opposition parties must be permitted to have a 
voice in local administrative organs. 
 
Perhaps if this last requirement had been met months ago, there would be less 
dissatisfaction and, in some cases, open rebellion, among local UTO field 
commanders. UTO forces have now all officially been registered with the 
government and moved into training camps, where they are supposed to remain 
until they are reintegrated into Tajikistan's national armed forces. However, on 
several occasions in the recent past, groups of UTO troops have left their base 
camps and entered nearby villages, where they have raided local police stations 
and sometimes private residences. President Rahmonov and his administration 
are understandably perturbed over this situation and have pointed to these 
incidents as evidence that it is the opposition which is responsible for slowing 
down the peace process. The UTO chief of staff, Mirzokhuja Nizomov, has said 
that the troops leave their camps due to poor living conditions and inadequate 
food supplies. (ITAR-TASS World Service, 1204 GMT, 28 Apr 99; FBIS-SOV-
1999-0428) If the UTO troops had their own representatives in the 
administrations of the towns located near their camps, perhaps they would not 
feel compelled to raid police stations and residences for food and other supplies. 
Instead, opposition members in the regional and district-level government organs 
might act as intermediaries with local leaders in order to resolve the UTO troops' 
most pressing needs and/or complaints. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Baltic States 
By Kate Martin 
 
LITHUANIA 
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Wanted: One PM who works well with others 
President Valdas Adamkus has less than two weeks remaining to nominate a 
prime minister with whom he can work, after having more than a hand in the 
resignation of Gediminas Vagnorius. Former Social Security and Labor Minister 
(in the Vagnorius government) Irene Degutiene, named the caretaker prime 
minister on 5 May, says she is not qualified to hold the post permanently. (BNS, 
0922 GMT, 5 May 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0505) 
 
Dissension between the president and Vagnorius' government started to grow a 
few months ago, with members of the media and presidential administration 
calling for the government to step down and for new elections to be held. Critics 
claimed that corruption had become pervasive in the operation of the system of 
supplying electricity to Belarus and projects for linking Lithuania's electricity 
system to that of West Europe. (INTERFAX, 0715 GMT, 2 Mar 99; FBIS-SOV-
1999-0302) A war of words escalated in April, with the government calling 
Adamkus a "usurper," claiming he was seeking greater presidential power. A 
"new political tendency is now becoming apparent in Lithuania -- the president's 
aspiration to take over a part of the government's duties and functions,'" a 
statement from the governmental press service announced. (Baltic News Service 
DAILY REPORT, 1600 GMT, 19 Apr 99) That night, in an address televised over 
the country's four main television channels, Adamkus publicly expressed his 
mistrust of the Vagnorius administration. 
 
While most Seimas members reaffirmed their support of Vagnorius (the ruling 
coalition of the Conservative Party and the Christian Democrats holds a majority 
in parliament), all political forces outside the government supported the no-
confidence measure. Adamkus then made it clear that, despite the coalition's 
support, he still believed Vagnorius should resign. Vagnorius would reach the 
same decision: His office issued a statement saying that he would consider 
leaving the post for the good of Lithuanian, since "the confrontation between the 
president and the government or the ruling parliamentary coalition would cause 
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extensive damage to the country." (Baltic News Service DAILY REPORT, 1000 
GMT, 20 Apr 99) Most Lithuanians participating in a poll in mid-April seemed to 
agree with the president. Some 73 percent of respondents said they believed the 
country was experiencing a political crisis, and 50 percent believed the Vagnorius 
cabinet should step down, according to the poll conducted by the Baltic 
Studies/Gallup company. Another poll placed Vagnorius out of the top 20 in 
terms of popularity, even though most other politicians gained public support in 
April. (Baltic News Service DAILY REPORT, 1000 GMT, 27 Apr 99) By the end 
of the month, citing his willingness to assume partial responsibility for the political 
conflict, Vagnorius announced he would resign. On 5 May, Adamkus accepted 
the resignation of the prime minister and six Cabinet members, including 
Degutiene. 
 
LATVIA 
You say 'tomato' ... 
Discussions continue on Latvia's language law, once more prompted by the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). When the draft 
language law was being debated in September 1998, OSCE High Commissioner 
for National Minorities Max van der Stoel recommended some changes, 
specifically addressing provisions that would mandate the use of the state 
language in the private sector. (Baltic News Service DAILY REPORT, 1300 
GMT, 26 Sep 98) Lack of a quorum delayed the final vote before the October 
1998 elections, and the draft law reappeared on the agenda this spring. 
 
Prime Minister Vilis Kristopans recently weighed in, agreeing with Van der Stoel. 
On 19 April Kristopans presented proposals to parliament that would make the 
draft language law compatible with international agreements. The current version 
of the law includes strict provisions concerning the use of the state language in 
all companies with state-owned holdings. In accordance with Van der Stoel's 
recommendations, Kristopans suggests that those provisions be applicable only 
to companies where the state holds at least one-half of the shares. According to 
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the prime minister, state interference in the private sector is justifiable only if 
required by such public interests as national security, territorial integrity, or public 
safety. (Baltic News Service DAILY REPORT, 1000 GMT, 19 Apr 99) Support for 
easing the law's restrictions also has been heard from European Commission 
President Jacques Santer and EC Foreign Affairs Commissioner Hans van der 
Broek. Both stressed in a meeting with Kristopans that the law should guarantee 
the basic freedom and the freedom of business. (Baltic News DAILY REPORT, 
1300 GMT, 22 Apr 99) 
 
ESTONIA 
Give me your tired, your poor, your huddled...entrepreneurs 
Economic self-interest and security may work wonders where international 
pressure has failed to improve substantially the lives of non-Estonians. Interior 
Minister Juri Mois believes that the country's policy concerning non-citizens has 
been too inflexible and needs amending, for the sake of internal security and 
economic opportunity. "The state should be braver in making exceptions in the 
granting of citizenship and at the same time make the status of alien in Estonia 
more attractive," Mois said. The existing regulations are placing obstacles in the 
way of foreign investors and entrepreneurs, who face hurdles when applying for 
residence and work permits, Mois said. "Also, Estonia's national interests require 
that resident stateless persons and aliens holding the citizenship of Russia and 
other countries be given a clear message that they are in every way personae 
gratae in our country," he added. (Baltic News Service DAILY REPORT, 1000 
GMT, 29 Apr 99) 
 
Of course, not all non-citizens are welcome: Agitators Petr Rozhok and Oleg 
Morozov, leaders of the Tallinn branch of the Union of Russian Citizens, have 
been asked to leave the country, since they refuse to apply for temporary 
residence permits. Rozhok was given six months to pack his bags, while 
Morozov has to leave by the beginning of June. (RADIOSTANTSIYA EKHO 
MOSKVY, 0800 GMT, 4 May 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0504) This is not the first time 
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that authorities have tried to remove Rozhok from Estonian soil. Procedural 
errors caused a revocation of an earlier expulsion order. The Tallinn district court 
ruled that, in its March 1995 attempt to deport the Russian citizen, the Citizenship 
and Migration Department had not provided the proper documentation. (OMRI 
DAILY DIGEST, 8 Oct 96) Rozhok is also a member of Vladimir Zhirinovsky's 
Liberal Democratic Party in Estonia, and at one time faced charges for calling on 
Russian army veterans to form paramilitary units "for defending the (Russians') 
honor and dignity." (BNS, 0751 GMT, 9 Feb 94; FBIS-SOV-94-028) Morozov also 
is no stranger to Estonian authorities: Last year he was charged with inciting 
ethnic and political hostility in organizing unsanctioned rallies. (RADIO ROSSII 
NETWORK, 1000 GMT, 30 Jan 98; FBIS-SOV-98-030) 
 
'I spy with my own eye...' 
Russian authorities apprehended an Estonian citizen on 21 April as he reportedly 
was obtaining information on the Russian airborne division stationed in the Pskov 
region. Petr Kalachev, a member of the Kaitseliit (Defense League), allegedly 
was attempting to recruit officers in the division and gather information on the 
combat readiness of Russia's airborne units, as well as details on their 
armaments and personnel. According to an ITAR-TASS report, the Russian 
authorities -- taking into account the small amount of damage "done to the 
Russian security, (...) his frank confession, and also guided by the desire to 
establish good-neighbourly relations with the Republic of Estonia" -- expelled 
Kalachev instead of prosecuting him on charges. (ITAR-TASS, 1441 GMT, 23 
Apr 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0423) Major Riho Uhtegi, chief of Estonia's defense 
forces intelligence branch, denied that Kalachev had any connection with military 
intelligence. (Baltic News Service DAILY REPORT, 1800 GMT, 24 Apr 99) 
According to Heiki Kirotar, spokesman for the Defense League, the paramilitary 
unit does not have a mandate to carry out intelligence activities. The Kaitseliit 
once possessed an information department, Kirotar said, but due to restructuring, 
now only a small team with the personnel department exists, to check the 
background of volunteers. (Baltic News Service DAILY REPORT, 1300 GMT, 26 
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Apr 99) Official Estonian government denials aside, it would not be outside the 
bounds of credibility that the defense ministry would organize reconnaissance 
activities to determine as much as possible about the strength and undertakings 
of Russian military units in Pskov. Geographic proximity alone, never mind 
security issues, would warrant intelligence-gathering exercises. Perhaps the 
Estonian government should allocate additional funds, however, on the training 
of intelligence officers. 
 
 
Copyright Boston University Trustees 1999 
Unless otherwise indicated, all articles appearing in this journal were written especially for 
Analyst. This article was originally published at 
http://www.bu.edu/iscip/digest/vol4/ed0408.html. 
